This study analyzes the trade-off between strategic flexibility and commitment for cases of simultaneous and related strategic investments under high levels of uncertainty. It develops a model that, using a Cournot game and real option theory, demonstrates that (1) a correlated strategic investment adds value to a portfolio of ongoing strategic investments in a decreasing marginal fashion, and (2) the new investment delays the development of the other investments.
INTRODUCTION
The real options approach to strategic decisions has become powerful tool in analyzing strategic commitments under uncertainty. Most studies that follow this approach within the strategic management field share a salient characteristic, namely, the independence of strategic investments with other on-going strategic investments (Chang, 1995; Folta, 1998; Kogut, 1991; Mang, 1998) . That is, they do not allow for the existence of interactions within a portfolio of strategic investments. However, it is widely recognized that firms typically consider a set of simultaneous strategic investments in similar strategic domains and that these investments often exhibit important correlations (Madhok, 1997) . Several different studies show that extending single option analysis to multiple options analysis, in the presence of correlations between the underlying assets, is far from straightforward (Johnson, 1987; McGrath, 1997; Stulz, 1982; Trigeorgis, 1996) . Multiple options analysis is even more challenging when the firm faces rivalry for the investment opportunity (Kulatilaka and Perotti, 1998) .
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the trade-off between flexibility and commitment in the case of multiple and simultaneous investments in oligopolistic markets. By combining concepts from oligopoly and real options theory, this paper builds a model of simultaneous compound options that mimics the strategic process of firms' investments across alternative market environments. The solution of the model is a decision rule that optimizes the choice of a portfolio of strategic investments.
The model relaxes three common assumptions found in previous real options studies: (a) the firm has monopoly over an investment opportunity, (b) the product market is perfectly competitive, and (c) the value of one strategic option is independent of the value of other simultaneous strategic investments. Kulatilaka and Perotti (1998) relax the first two assumptions within a compound option model. This current study generalizes their work by relaxing the independence assumption.
Following Kulatilaka and Perotti (1998) , this paper assumes that an initial investment results in the acquisition of a capability that allows the firm take better advantage of future growth opportunities. The source of option value comes from the cumulative nature of this resource or capability. Given that the capability is path-dependent, it is very difficult or costly to make instantaneous adjusts of its level (Dierickx and Cool, 1989) . A firm can internalize the benefits of better market conditions if and only if it has already developed certain resources or capabilitiesi.e., has bought an option. Since the main purpose of this study is to analyze the effect of correlation between strategic options, the option is analyzed in relationship with the rest of the portfolio. The critical feature of the portfolio is that the options are seeking a first-mover type of competitive advantage. Framed in this way, the exercise of one option can negatively affect the value of the remaining options of the portfolio. In addition, it affects the value of the firm competitors' similar options. This is the case, for example, of a pharmaceutical company carrying out research in a specific biotechnological domain through different strategic alliances. Discovery of a drug by one alliance diminishes or eliminates the value of the remaining related alliances and that of competitors' ongoing research in a similar technological domain.
The model's two main findings are that the value of a new strategic option in a correlated portfolio of investments in an oligopolistic market has decreasing marginal returns and that the exercise of one option delays the exercise of other options. A commendable feature of the model is that previous real options models can be shown to be special cases. More important, the present model highlights the possibility of having strategic investments that creates value in isolation but destroy value when they are considered within a portfolio of related investments. In addition, the 5 model generates market power and resource-based types of competitive advantages, characteristics not fully explored in previous models.
The next section presents the model. Section two provides the solution of the model. The solution is a decision rule that optimizes the investments in simultaneous strategic growth options.
Section three presents a numerical analysis and describes the most salient findings of the model. Section four contains a discussion of the results, implications and limitations. Section five concludes.
A MODEL OF SIMULTANEOUS GROWTH OPTIONS
The task of building competitive capabilities and strong market positions requires significant resource commitments. Typically, a single firm cannot amass sufficient resources to finance expansion in all profitable market opportunities. Partial commitments often enable the firm to create an upper bound on the risks associated with placing the bet so that the opportunity will be realized, often by decreasing the total investment cost to an affordable level. If the decision to make partial commitments derives from the prospect of expanding into a new product or market, which can materialize after additional information reduces environmental uncertainty, then this decision is equivalent to buying a call option. As stated above, this study is concerned with those types of investments that provide to the firm a first mover competitive advantage (e.g., obtaining a patent). Therefore, when the firm has a portfolio of this type of simultaneous investments, the decision to exercise the option is likely to generate a loss in the value in all the remaining correlated options. Similarly, in the presence of competitors with similar strategic approaches and in related products and markets, the decision to exercise this option is likely to generate a loss on the value in all the remaining competitors' equivalent options and may induce competitors' divestiture of particular options. Divestiture arises because the value of the investment includes 6 both the cash flows stemming from current assets and those stemming from asset redeployment or future expansion (Myers, 1977) . The latter cash flows are only realized if the business is expanded, and therefore exercising the option requires further commitment.
The model distinguishes four investment alternatives: full strategic commitment, minor resource commitment ("buying" a real option), major resource commitments ("exercising" the option), and divestitures (abandoning the unexercised option). This paper assumes that two critical differences distinguish buying an option (minor resource commitment) from fully committing resources. First, when the firm buys an option, investments are not entirely irreversible. Second, only full commitments generate current income, which can be appropriated by the firm. That is, the option value is contingent upon the value of the corresponding major resource commitment. Real options are temporary investment vehicles, which will either disappear or be convened into a full strategic commitment at some point in time. It is worth noting that the only difference between a full strategic commitment and a major resource commitment is the investment sequence. While the former consist in a "one-shot" investment, the latter is conditional to the previous existence of a minor resource commitment. After the major resource commitment is done, it generates the same cash-flow stream than a similar ongoing full resource commitment. In fact, every major or full resource commitment is an option on future market growth (a compound option).
The model departs from previous ones in several aspects. Most previous real option models assume that each investor owned a single undeveloped asset, which could become a developed asset by paying a strike price or development cost (Brennan and Schwartz, 1985; Paddock, Siegel, and Smith, 1988; Titman, 1985) . Departures from this assumption have been scarce (e.g., Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Trigeorgis, 1996; Williams, 1992) yet are critical if one is to incorporate the effects of strategic interaction among firms into the analysis of their investment 7 decisions. The model also departs from the proprietary/single asset perspective. First, it assumes that firms compete to accumulate capacity and fulfill demand within each market. Second, it assumes that firms may have simultaneous access to multiple real options within a market.
Ultimately, they may decide to develop only a sub-set of these options into a major resource commitment.
In the model, each firm has initial access to a portfolio of real options within the market for those options' output. Market size (demand) is assumed to grow stochastically over time. At some point in time, the firm may decide to exercise a subset of its options within the market, converting them into major resource commitments. The firm will then use these investments as vehicles to expand its activities within the market. In subsequent periods, the firm will further develop internally these investments, trying to catch up with market growth. The remaining options will lose strategic importance to the firm and will be divested. As long as the market keeps growing over time, the firm can always marginally increase its market presence. Thus, the option to expand in the market never expires, and each new round of financing corresponds to exercising an additional stage in a compound option with infinite stages.
Each firm is a player in a Cournot game with conjectural variations specific to each of its options' output markets. A firm's current market sales are derived from an expression for the optimal output from aggregate investment sales in that market. In order to attain its optimum output goal in a market, the firm develops an optimal number of fully committed strategic investments. The optimum is derived as the Cournot solution to a capital accumulation game involving all the firms in the market. A major resource commitment causes the upside potential value of the remaining options belonging to the firm's portfolio to fall. Therefore, the calculation of the net capital gain from developing options takes into account the expected negative effect of development upon the value of the firm's undeveloped option portfolio, as well as the effect of possible retaliation by the firm's competitors with similar options. This stylized feature is critical, since a failure to consider the expected negative effect on the firm's undeveloped option portfolio would induce investments that destroy value.
The model is set up in three stages. First, it derives from Cournot first-order profitmaximization conditions an expression for each project's current income. Second, it addresses the issue of change in a project's income over time. This implies determining expressions for market growth and for the dynamics of full investments supply. And finally, the results from the first two stages are incorporated into two option valuation expressions to determine the market values of the portfolios of options and full commitment investments.
Project Current Income.
Consider a market-segment s within which the firm i develops K si majority investments during period t. The set of these K si investments is designated as a full commitment investment si.
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The profit function of a full commitment investment si within market-segment s, and the corresponding Cournot first-order profit maximization conditions, are given by the following expressions: The expression for full commitment investment si's marginal revenue from [2] can be transformed as follows (Scherer and Ross, 1990, pp: 229) :
where s e = own-price output demand elasticity within market-segment s, and si s = market-share of full commitment investment si.
With a little algebra and some standard assumptions (see Appendix 1) it is possible to arrive to the following expression to si y , which is the current income from a full commitment investment:
[4]
Change in Project Over Time
The exogenous variable market size s x changes stochastically through time, and it is assumed to follow a geometric Wiener process
where s μ and s σ are the mean and standard deviation of the growth rate in the exogenous marketsize s x , and the variable t and z are time and a standard Wiener process. Since it is assumed that the market growth rates s s x dx are correlated across market-segments, the values of different categories of projects can be correlated in equilibrium.
At all times, there are n firms operating within each segment s, where a segment is one line of business in one geographic area. These firms are assumed to develop majority investments in accordance with a Cournot capital accumulation game. This is a prototypical model which has an extremely simple structure, but whose basic properties are the same as those of more general models (Tirole, 1988, pp. 315) . Consider a market-segment s within which firm i competes with 1 The current income si y is restricted to be non-negative, which is verified for 
If all firms invest at their optimal Cournot level over period t, then
Total development cost by firm i is given by si si C K . Notice that an increase in the cost disadvantage si C leads to a reduction in the size of the full commitment investment si K developed by firm i. The restriction that total development cost of firm i is increasing in si C , or
C , is imposed. This holds for all s β and si C , such that
The aggregate supply s q of majority investments changes deterministically through time, in accordance with the following expression:
where s b is the aggregate observed development rate within a specific segment s, and si I is a decision variable for firm i, corresponding to the proportion of si K that it effectively decides to develop during period t, according to the option model's solution.
Market-value of Full Commitments and Real Options
The current-market value of each minor resource commitment (real option) and full commitment investment can be specified as ) x , (q Vu conditions. In other words, in this model market power is one source of competitive advantage.
MODEL SOLUTION
The previous section provides the valuation functions for different types of commitment.
The next step is to determine the decision rule for whether to partially or fully commit resources.
Following Williams (1992) and Ravara (1994) , the model is solved in five steps. First, it is temporarily assumed that there is a finite and non-negative level of current income y = y* from each full commitment investment, above which firm i is willing to convert an option j into the corresponding major commitment j. values of F and G are used to find the switching point y*. And fifth, the switching point y* is shown to verify the temporary assumption in the first step above.
In order to solve the investment problem above, the following transformations are made:
, and G(y) x) Vu(q, = . With these transformations, F(y) and G(y) are the current market values of the full commitment investments and the real option investments, respectively, conditional only on y per full commitment investment. Since both [11] and [12] are linear on the decision variable si I , then the optimal * si I will be either zero or one (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) .
The following inequalities are temporarily assumed to hold: 
[19]
Let π represent a generic parameter, and consider parameter values that satisfy the assumed inequalities in [19] . The coefficient of the control (y) I si in [19] is proportional to the value H(y⏐x) from the following function:
Notice that, if 
Expression [21] is increasing on x, ω, and s/|e| for s/|e|<0.5, and is decreasing in υ, κ, and q. With perfectly competitive ventures (q=∞), the term G' becomes equal to zero. 
NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
This section generates a set of critical results derived from function [26] . Given that y* is the root of H(y), and dH(y)/dy is increasing in the vicinity of y*, a state variable change accelerates development of full commitment investment if it either causes H(y) to shift upwards (y* has to decrease to insure that H(y*)=0), or if it causes y to increase, and thereby generates an increase in
. Therefore, two types of effects exist: those that induce a movement on the value of y and those that induce a movement of the value of y* and, therefore, shift the curve H(y). Equation [26] shows that y* is a function of many variables that do not affect y. In order to focus the analysis in the effect on the individual options of having a portfolio of simultaneous and related options, this study analyzes variables that only affect y*.
The complexity of the functions makes it very difficult to obtain an analytical solution for the effect of changes in the model variables on the investment policy. This section provides, instead, a numerical analysis. Fortunately, the results are highly stable under wide ranges of parameters. The initial scenario is that of a firm with a single option, a (unit) cost disadvantage of 33%, and no risk aversion. The market grows at 15% annually with 25% of volatility, and the risk-free rate is 6%. (Black and Scholes, 1973; Merton, 1973) . Similar to what occurs with financial options, an increase in the market growth rate μ tends to accelerate development, whereas increases in market variance σ, the risk-free interest rate ι, or the risk aversion coefficient λ, tend to delay development.
This study central concern is on the economic effect of the presence of interdependence between simultaneous strategic investments. Therefore, the numerical analysis focuses on the marginal effect of a new strategic option on the overall value of the portfolio and on the exercise policy of the remaining options. For this purpose, it was simulated the effect of new options (i.e., increase in ω) on H(y*). Figure 1 shows the geometry of the effect -the "portfolio effect".
Insert Figure 1 about here
As Figure 1 shows, a new strategic option increases the value of the switching point at a decreasing rate. Therefore, the value added of the option, compared to the value added of a full commitment, increases at a decreasing rate. This means that, since the switching point y* has to increase in order to ensure that H(y*) = 0, an increase in ω causes development to be delayed. It can be concluded that:
(1) New partial commitments in a correlated portfolio have decreasing marginal returns; and
(2) The greater the number of competitive options (ω), the greater are the incentives to delay developments.
These results are particularly interesting. For an option to be worthy, it is not enough to have a positive option value by itself, but only in relationship to the rest of the portfolio. In order to create value, the flexibility gain of a single option should compensate the marginal loses due to the presence of correlation with other ongoing options. These findings are consistent with similar studies in the financial literature, in particular, those of Stulz (1982) and Johnson (1987) for the contract "an option on the maximum of several assets".
The This result shows that real options theory supports both market power and resource-based sources of competitive advantages. Market power is the result of the oligopolistic structure of the industry. The model generates a Cournot equilibrium, which implies supracompetitive returns. These abnormal returns are generated for cases of high uncertainty, and modeled using Ito's process. Resource-based competitive advantages come from the assumption of imperfect market. In particular, the model can reach the equilibrium having firms with different cost structures -i.e., it is applicable to situations of different resources and capabilities.
DISCUSSION
This study develops a model that provides a decision rule for simultaneous and related strategic investments with a compound option value. This decision rule stresses the possibility of destroying value if the correlation between the strategic options, and between the firm and its competitors' unit costs, are not taken into consideration. The main message is "not every option that in isolation has positive option value is worthy". This highly important result for strategic management scholars and for practitioners is underemphasized in the current literature. McGrath and MacMillan (2000: 183) point out how common it is in companies to observe a failure in the design of the portfolio of strategic investments, having overlapping between options in a confusing fashion.
The model has limitations. Chi (2000) shows that it is difficult to gain an accurate understanding of a particular strategic situation without explicitly modeling its structure. Stated differently, not every option model is worthy for every situation. In particular, the model developed here is only valid for an specific context: the case of a portfolio of compound options that gives the firm a first mover competitive advantage in a market with an oligopolistic structure. The investments refer to a specific resource or capability that allows the firm to capture market growth before its competitors. In order to accomplish its objective, the model assumptions regarding the external environment are somewhat under-represented. Market growth rates are correlated across markets while competitors' strategic decisions are only relevant within the market under analysis. Natural markets may present challenging complexities. For example, it is reasonable to expect the presence of multipoint competition between competitors. If this were the case, it would also possible to observe mutual forbearance hypothesis to hold, making invalid the assumption of a Cournot equilibrium. To what extent the model's conclusions are still valid under these circumstances is a matter for future exploration.
Another highly interesting topic to explore is whether the model holds up in the presence of a special type of capability: the ability to create and configure the optimum portfolio of strategic investments. An example is the case of a joint development of capabilities -i.e., strategic alliances. If the firm has a portfolio of first-stage options, it might not have the resources or the willingness to develop all them into second-stage options. In such situation, the aggregate value of the firm's undeveloped investment portfolio is magnified relative to the value of its achievable developed investment portfolio, and the firm is likely to become very sensitive to the negative effect of development on the value of its undeveloped (partial) commitments.
When the firm is carrying out many strategic alliances, the negative effect may include a deterioration in business relationships between the investing firm and its partners in first-stage options. Then, the firm is even more sensitive to the negative effect of development on the value of undeveloped commitments. Therefore, firms willing to build capabilities through a network of partners should focus on their capabilities to manage portfolios of simultaneous and related growth options, as opposed to managing exclusive options within a portfolio. [ ]
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Notice that, once the firm has incurred its fixed investment costs si c , 0 y si > is a necessary and sufficient condition for the firm to keep producing output from its investment position si. 
APPENDIX B Additional Conditions of the Capital Accumulation Game
Assume that the following inequality holds for all si c :
Then, there is a unique Cournot equilibrium with equilibrium price s P , defined as follows:
Each firm is assumed to know its competitors marginal cost function, and to believe that all its competitors will invest in accordance with their Cournot reaction functions. The profit function si Π of MNE i is specified as follows: In general, let F = F(y) be the value of a firm's opportunity to invest in a risky project, with y = y(x,q). To find F(y) and the optimal investment rule, consider the return of the following portfolio: hold the option, which is worth F(y), and go short dF/dy units of the project. 
Since the process dq/q in equations [19] and [20] is deterministically defined by expression [18], b 2 = 0. Therefore, [C.7] can be simplified as: Notice that y ξ 1 approaches zero as y approaches zero, whereas y ξ 2 is a perpetuity corresponding to the flow of revenue from the D-position discounted at the risk adjusted discount
, but which is also expected to grow at the rate λσ μ ρ − = . It can be shown that y ξ 1 is the upper bound for F, and y ξ 2 is its lower bound (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Williams, 1992 
Market Value of an Option Position
Since the underlying differential equations have the same structure, the procedure for determining the market value of an undeveloped position G(y) is similar to that followed to solve for F(y). Equations [19] 
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APPENDIX F Prof for Equation 26
The function H in [20] 
